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In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States declared that the purpose of the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution is “to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”2  Broadly speak-
ing, courts have understood that they were preserving this
marketplace of ideas primarily in the face of government interfer-
ence.3  The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”4  That language invokes the
colloquial image of the quintessential speaker in America: a person
standing on a soap box in the town square speaking her mind into a
megaphone with Congress restrained by the text of the First Amend-
ment and unable to interfere.  Partnered with this image is the idea of
common, public, and shared spaces where people are concentrated
and, thus, become the audience for the paradigmatic speaker.
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1 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
2 Id. at 390.
3 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 233 (2006) (“Strictly speaking—
legally speaking—the right to free speech in the United States means the right to be
free from punishment by the government in retaliation for at least some (probably
most) speech. . . . [Speech’s] constitutional protection is a protection against the
government.”).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Advances in technology have shaped the way that citizens “speak,”
both to the polity at large and to one another individually.  As each
development in media technology arises, it brings with it many bene-
fits, such as expanding the scope of one’s audience and the ability to
target a narrow, yet specific, audience more precisely.  The move to
new media platforms for speech—Twitter,5 Facebook,6 BlogSpot,7
YouTube,8 and others—has changed the legal landscape that protects
such speech because speakers are largely no longer operating in pub-
lic or in publicly owned spaces.  Instead, by using Internet forums for
their expression, modern speakers are communicating in a forum that
is governed by contract.9
Internet users, however, by and large still have the impression
that they have the same constitutional protections when speaking on
the Internet that they do in the proverbial town square.10  In some
circumstances that intuition is correct.  The government cannot pass
legislation limiting speech on the Internet, without such legislation
being subject to constitutional scrutiny.11  In addition, government
actors cannot escape scrutiny for firing someone in retaliation for
speech made on the Internet.12  Many of the same limitations on gov-
ernment action that exist in real space also exist on the Internet.13
But those popular intuitions are incorrect in two main ways.  First,
many consumers and media commentators believe that when an
5 TWITTER, www.twitter.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
6 FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
7 BLOGSPOT, www.blogspot.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
8 YOUTUBE, www.youtube.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Section I.A.
11 See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (holding that the chal-
lenged provisions of the Child Online Protection Act were content-based speech
restrictions and also not the least restrictive means to achieve the goal of the regula-
tion among effective alternatives); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859, 874, 879 (1997)
(holding that section 223(a) and section 223(d) of the Communications Decency Act
are content-based restrictions on speech and that the act as written lacks the precision
the First Amendment requires for such restrictions).
12 See, e.g., Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No.1:1–CV–1301–RWS, 2011 WL 4601020,
at *2 (N.D. Ga., Sept. 30, 2011) (upholding the magistrate’s determination that under
the first prong of the Pickering test, the public employee’s Facebook posting
“addressed a matter of public concern, specifically, ‘the integrity of the law enforce-
ment services’” of the local police department, and thus is “entitled to First Amend-
ment protection”), rev’d, 2013 WL 5645316, at *2 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that
although the plaintiff had a speech interest in her Facebook postings it was “not a
strong one” and that the department’s interest in minimizing disruption to the
department outweighed the plaintiff’s speech interests).
13 See infra Part III.
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Internet speech forum provider, like Google or Twitter, interferes
with or limits their speech, the forum provider has infringed upon
their First Amendment rights.14  Second, users believe that Terms of
Service agreements only affect their relationship to the Internet
speech forum provider.15  While it may be formalistically true that a
contract only affects the rights of the two contracting parties, in prac-
tice these Terms of Service contracts may have wider reaching conse-
quences.  Users by and large do not contemplate that Terms of
Service contracts can affect their ability to redress some types of gov-
ernment action against some of their speech acts online.
Part I of this Note will canvas popular opinions and perceptions
about First Amendment rights on the Internet using examples of pub-
lic outcry over recent instances of speech limitation.  It will also dis-
cuss the state action doctrine generally and how the presence of this
doctrine most likely renders certain popular public constitutional
intuitions about the First Amendment erroneous.
Part II will provide an overview of how courts have taken an
expansive and protective view of private ordering between online par-
ties.  It will discuss how courts have developed a robust freedom to
contract jurisprudence in the Internet context.  Because courts essen-
tially have a presumption in favor of the enforceability of the contract
so long as it meets basic formal requirements, it is difficult for users to
challenge the Terms of Service between themselves and an Internet
speech forum provider substantively or procedurally.  Coupled with
this doctrinal presumption is an ideological inclination in favor of pri-
vate ordering on the Internet as the best way for parties to organize
themselves to reduce bargaining and transaction costs.
Part III will examine how this robust freedom to contract has
affected online speech.  Particularly, this Note will discuss the rise of
government take-down requests made to Internet speech forum prov-
iders regarding non-copyrighted material.  This Note will contend
that Internet Terms of Service contracts effectively shield the govern-
ment from constitutional scrutiny of its take-down requests.  The fact
that users and the government now have to act through the intermedi-
ary of both the Internet speech forum provider and its Terms of Ser-
vice has limited speakers’ ability to challenge government action
concerning their speech directly.
Part IV will focus on the lasting implications of the Terms of Ser-
vice regime on speech rights.  First, it will argue that the government’s
use of the Terms of Service as a potential shield from constitutional
14 See infra Part I.
15 See infra Part I.
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scrutiny puts the Internet speech forum provider in the position of
having to vindicate users’ rights on their behalf.  Given that the
ratifiers of the Constitution likely did not contemplate that one day
citizens would need to rely on private companies for this function, this
Note will examine whether there are sufficient market incentives in
place to ensure that an Internet speech form provider will execute
this newly developed responsibility with sufficient transparency and to
the extent that users desire.  Second, it will argue that the Terms of
Service regime in the speech context has created the rough equivalent
of the third party doctrine in the privacy context, but with significantly
fewer formal limitations on government action.  Finally, this Note will
propose two solutions to this problem: (1) a statutory regime requir-
ing more legal process in order for the government to make a take-
down request to an Internet speech form provider regarding a private
citizen’s speech; and (2) greater scrutiny of contract terms which will
consider the free speech implications of some Terms of Service
provisions.
In addressing these arguments, this Note will not focus on
Internet speech acts that are subject to copyright law and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).16  Rather, this Note will consider
user-generated speech that does not implicate copyright claims.  Addi-
tionally, this Note does not focus on speech content that is on a web-
site an individual builds and maintains for herself since in that
circumstance there is unlikely to be a Terms of Service contract.  It
will instead focus on speech such as an originally composed posting
on Twitter (“tweet”) or Facebook (“status update” or “newsfeed post”
or “wall post”) or a blog posting hosted by a central blog site such as
BlogSpot, etc.  The reason for this limitation is to focus on the kinds
of speech that the average, technically unsophisticated speaker
engages in using popular Internet speech platforms.  Most commonly
these are social media sites, blogs, and search engines.  While copy-
right issues and speech issues overlap, this Note exclusively focuses on
speech issues that do not raise substantial or controlling copyright
issues in order to examine the effect of a site’s Terms of Service con-
tract on ordinary Internet speech.
16 For in-depth treatments of the effect of copyright law, digital rights manage-
ment systems, and the DMCA on free speech and fair use, see generally Julie E.
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97
MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by
Machine, 160 J. INST’L & THEOR. ECON. 1 (2004); Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored
in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010).
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I. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND PUBLIC FIRST AMENDMENT NORMS
A. YouTube and the White House Inquiry
In mid-September 2012 a trailer for a movie entitled “Innocence
of Muslims,” which was posted to the video sharing website YouTube,
sparked some anti-American protests abroad.17  As reports that the
video’s anti-Islamic content was inciting these protests increased, the
White House contacted YouTube to determine whether the video vio-
lated YouTube’s Terms of Service.18  Google, which owns YouTube,
responded that the video “was clearly within [YouTube’s] guidelines”
and thus “will stay on YouTube.”19  YouTube took steps to block access
to the video in several countries, most notably India, Indonesia, Egypt,
and Libya.20
In the United States, many news outlets picked up the report of
the White House’s request to have the validity of the video’s posting
and content reviewed under the Terms of Service.  An article on the
Politico website reported that many speech activists were deeply troub-
led by the White House’s inquiry.21  In the article, Eva Galperin of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation expressed concern that asking You-
Tube if the video violated its Terms of Service “sends a message and
has a certain chilling effect.”22  Ben Wizner of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union recognized that although “[there is] no indication that
the government is questioning the right of these idiots to make that
repellent film . . . it does make us nervous when the government
throws its weight behind any requests for censorship.”23
These quotations focus on the symbolic statement of such a
request, rather than the legal validity of the government’s inquiry.
Nevertheless, even a brief look at the user comments section of the
various Internet articles on this story reveals a very different sense of
the speech implications resulting from the White House’s inquiry.
Rather than being concerned about a “chilling effect” the inquiry
17 David Makamura, White House Asked YouTube to Review Anti-Muslim Film, WASH.
POST (Sept. 14, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-polit
ics/wp/2012/09/14/white-house-asked-youtube-to-review-anti-muslim-film/.
18 Id.
19 John Clarke, Google, YouTube Refuse White House Request to Pull Anti-Islamic Film,
FORBES (Sept. 15, 2012, 12:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnclarke/2012/
09/15/google-refuses-white-house-request-to-pull-anti-islamic-film/.
20 Id.
21 Josh Gerstein, Activists Troubled by White House Call to YouTube, POLITICO (Sept.
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could have, some commenters remarked that the inquiry itself was a
limit on free speech.24  Others thought that so long as the govern-
ment only inquired into the validity of the video posting under You-
Tube’s Terms of Service, but did not demand that the video be
removed, no speech infringement had occurred.25  Many other com-
menters were outraged at what they identified as the government’s
double standard in asking about the validity of this video, but not
requesting that other similarly offensive videos targeted at other relig-
ious or ethnic groups be reviewed.26  Some disagreed altogether with
YouTube’s assessment that the video was permissible under its Terms
of Service’s hate speech prohibition: “[YouTube] encourage[s] free
speech and defend[s] everyone’s right to express unpopular points of
view.  But we do not permit hate speech (speech which attacks or
demeans a group based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability,
gender, age, veteran status, and sexual orientation/gender iden-
tity).”27  Regardless of which specific position was taken, the com-
ments generally reflect a strong sense that speech such as the video
should not be subject to an inquiry of this sort, or if there is an
inquiry, there should be a clearer or more consistent policy of not
targeting one unpopular or highly offensive viewpoint over others.
While these circumstances of a video having been associated with
violent public protects affecting national security were extraordinary,
the interaction that took place between the White House and You-
Tube was quite ordinary for the social media era.  The typical process,
as indicated in website Community Standards pages,28 is as follows:
one user posts content that another person, either an individual, cor-
poration or government entity, finds problematic or offensive.  The
offended person contacts the Internet speech forum provider regard-
ing the validity of the posting or requests that the material be taken
down.  The Internet speech forum provider will then review its Terms
of Service to determine if the use or posting violated some provision.
Based on this assessment, the content is then either left to stand or is
taken down.  In the “Innocence of Muslims” case, it was the White
House that made an inquiry, but this template of events occurs with
24 Given that on many of these websites both users and the websites themselves
retain the right to delete user comment postings, I have not directly quoted the com-
ments here. See generally the comments section of the articles in supra notes 17, 19,
and 21.
25 See generally the comments section of the articles in supra notes 17, 19, and 21.
26 See generally the comments section of the articles in supra notes 17, 19, and 21.
27 Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/community_
guidelines (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
28 See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
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governmental actors and private actors alike.29  While it may be fair to
criticize the White House in this instance for taking action that could
chill speech, it would be hard to argue that the government lacked
“standing” to contact YouTube.  The White House or a private party
or a local law enforcement department can make a take-down request
because most commercial Internet speech forum Terms of Service
agreements allow for these types of complaints from essentially any
party.30
The user comments mentioned above about the White House’s
inquiry reflect a sense that this episode was an example of government
intrusion into free speech.  That general sense, however, does not par-
allel the actual legal status of the interaction between the White
House and YouTube.  The “community standards” that govern appro-
priate uses and postings in a speech forum like YouTube or Twitter
are governed by the Terms of Service, a contract.  These contracts
stand firmly in the realm of private law, with different legal conse-
quences and different analysis than constitutional law.31
B. The State Action Doctrine Generally and Its Effect
on Cyberspace Actions
In the above example, user-commentators expressed the sense
that had YouTube removed the “Innocence of Muslims” trailer from
its site—though in this particular case it did not—it would have been
an infringement on free speech.  Legally speaking, that belief is incor-
rect due to the state action doctrine: “[I]n its least nuanced form, [the
state action doctrine] rests on the observation that most constitutional
29 Erik Wemple, Twitter-Banned NBC Critic Talks!, WASH. POST (July 31, 2012, 12:30
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/post/twitter-banned-nbc-
critic-talks/2012/07/31/gJQA30npLX_blog.html; Amy Willis, London Olympics 2012:
Twitter ‘Alerted NBC to British Journalist’s Critical Tweets,’ TELEGRAPH (July 31, 2012, 8:01
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/9440137/London-Olympics-
2012-Twitter-alerted-NBC-to-British-journalists-critical-tweets.html.
30 See, e.g., General Policy Enforcement, YOUTUBE, http://support.google.com/you
tube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=92486 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
31 It is important to note that there may be very different implications from a
public policy or market standpoint if private users are making take-down requests that
are being honored.  The current Terms of Service regime treats both government
take-down requests and private party take-down requests the same.  This Note, how-
ever, will only focus on the implications of government requests.  In either case the
user who has content removed will have to challenge the removal on the underlying
contract rather than directly against the party who made the take-down request.  Pri-
vate handling (i.e., Internet speech forum take-down actions) of private party requests
may be just as problematic for preserving a robust speech culture as government
requests.
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commandments proscribe only the conduct of governmental
actors.”32  Broadly speaking, though there are some exceptions, only
governmental actors have their conduct limited by the prohibitions of
the amendments.  A private party is able to tell a guest on her land to
leave if she does not like something the guest has said, whereas a gov-
ernment employee would face constitutional scrutiny if she were to
similarly eject a person from government lands based on things the
person was saying.
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides textual sup-
port for the state action doctrine by specifying that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”33  The Fourteenth
Amendment makes the First Amendment enforceable against the
states in addition to the federal government.34  The First Amendment
limits the ability of Congress to act, but it makes no mention of private
and individual actors.  As a result, “the activities of private corpora-
tions . . . are not subject to the Constitution because they are not state
actors”35 and courts, with rare exceptions, have refused to enforce
constitutional limitations against private actors or to invalidate private
agreement provisions on constitutional grounds.
The most notable exception was the case of Shelley v. Kraemer36
where the Supreme Court held that, although private agreements to
exclude persons of a certain race from occupying designated real
estate does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, it does violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state
court to enforce these racially restrictive covenants.  The implication
of the Shelley holding is that a state court is a “state actor” in this nar-
row circumstance insofar as it enforces private contract provisions that
would be unconstitutional if the legislature had enacted a law with the
same substance.37  Thus, court enforcement of the racially restrictive
covenant is “state action” sufficient to satisfy the state action doc-
32 Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Doctrine Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263,
1266 (2000).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
34 Id. amend. XIV; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (making
First Amendment guarantees binding on the states by assuming that “freedom of
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridg-
ment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fourteenths Amendment from impairment by
the States”).
35 Berman, supra note 32, at 1266.
36 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
37 Id. at 11.
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trine.38  This is one of the rare instances where a provision of a private
agreement is held to be unenforceable—though not invalid—for consti-
tutional reasons.
It is important to note, however, that the court is careful not to
say that the provision itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.39  To
so hold would extend constitutional liability to a private actor.  The
court avoids this and holds that enforcement of the provision by the
courts would violate the Constitution.40  In the final result in Shelley,
the Court left the substance of the private agreement intact, even as it
held that it would be unconstitutional for a court to enforce those
provisions.41  The Court explained, “So long as the purposes of [the
racially restrictive covenants] are effectuated by voluntary adherence
to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by
the [s]tate and the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment have
not been violated.”42  This framing reinforces the status of private
agreements and “voluntary” adherence to their terms as being largely
outside the scope of constitutional scrutiny.
In light of the state action doctrine, courts have long struggled
with the question of whether to enforce constitutional command-
ments against owners of spaces that appear to be public, but are in fact
privately owned.  In Marsh v. Alabama43 the Supreme Court held that
although the town of Chickasaw, Alabama was privately owned, “the
corporation’s right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is [not]
coextensive with the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of
his guests.”44  Generally, private property owners are free to exclude
others from their land, but Chickasaw was so much like a public town
in appearance and function that the court determined that the own-
ers of Chickasaw had limitations on them similar to that of a govern-
mental actor.45  The operation of “facilities [that] are built and
operated primarily to benefit the public . . . is essentially a public func-
38 Id. at 13–16 (discussing the jurisprudence supporting and establishing the idea
that the judiciary is one arm through which “the state” acts).
39 Id. at 13 (“We conclude . . . that the restrictive agreements standing alone
cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Four-
teenth Amendment.”).
40 Id. at 19 (“The difference between judicial enforcement and non-enforcement
of the restrictive covenants is the difference . . . between being denied rights of prop-
erty available to other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment
of those rights on an equal footing.”).
41 Id. at 13.
42 Id.
43 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
44 Id. at 505–06.
45 Id. at 505–07.
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tion.”46  This holding suggests that if a privately owned space is suffi-
ciently public in character, then the owner of that space might be
subject to certain constitutional limitations on use of the property,
such as a prohibition on suppressing the speech of people on or using
the property.
In practice, however, Marsh’s holding has not been construed so
expansively.  Courts of all levels regularly distinguish from Marsh and
apply its holding as narrowly as possible.47
In the Internet context, this already difficult line between public
and private spaces continues to blur.48  As the user base to any
Internet service grows—whether it is America Online, Facebook, or
Google—the space where the users most often interact often appears
to be more public than private.49  Users often describe the things they
post in these spaces—like a Facebook status update or a YouTube
video they made—as something said “in public” as opposed to the
colloquially more private interaction of email.50  Indeed, even the
Twitter Terms of Service, essentially a private space with a vast user
base, helpfully warn: “What you say on Twitter may be viewed all
around the world instantly.  You are what you Tweet!”51  Nevertheless,
courts have explicitly declined to apply the de facto public space char-
acterization in Marsh to the Internet.52  Although the Internet
46 Id. at 506.
47 See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161 (1978) (distinguishing
Marsh on the basis that “the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors is
not traditionally an exclusive public function,” and quoting Justice Black’s dissent in
Food Employees. v. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968), for the proposition that pri-
vate property can be treated as though it were public only “when that property has
taken on all the attributes of a town”); Gonza´lez-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare,
Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 247–48 (1st Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Marsh on the basis that,
although some governments provide health care, the public function exception
applied only to traditionally exclusive public functions, not ones in which the public
and private have both been engaged).
48 See generally Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (rejecting the notion that America Online was a de facto public space
because it did not perform a traditional government function).
49 People v. Harris (Harris II), 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (“Twit-
ter is a public, real-time social and information network . . . .”).
50 Even courts use this language to describe user activity on Internet speech
forums. See id. at 597–98 (“The Constitution gives you the right to post, but as numer-
ous people have learned, there are still consequence for your public posts.  What you
give to the public belongs to the public.”).  By “public” the court in Harris II means
widely available with no or low barriers to access or control, not that Twitter is publicly
owned by the state or a municipality.  Here the court displays the same colloquial
usage of public that users do: anything said on Twitter is said “in public.”
51 Terms of Services, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
52 Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 451.
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“involves public characteristics,” it does not “involve the exercise of
any of the municipal powers or public services traditionally exercised
by the State so as to constitute a public system for purposes of the First
Amendment.”53
Despite the fact that Internet speech forums are often treated by
users and providers alike as public, because the space is privately
owned and because media is not a public service traditionally exer-
cised by the state, the state action doctrine will control. Although the
users negatively commenting on the White House-YouTube event
have the sense that free speech would have been infringed if YouTube
had taken the video down, legally speaking, that notion is incorrect.
YouTube, as a private and not a de facto public actor, would have
been free to remove the video since the First Amendment would not
apply.  A user who wanted to contest YouTube’s hypothetical take-
down of the video and sue alleging a violation of Due Process and
First Amendment rights would have been very unlikely to be success-
ful since YouTube has not been deemed to be a de facto public space
and would not fall into the narrow holding of Shelley.  Because a user
agrees to YouTube’s Terms of Service when using the site, the Terms
of Service govern the relationship between the user and YouTube.
The user’s only recourse to challenge this hypothetical take-down
would have been to demonstrate that YouTube breached its Terms of
Service agreement by removing something it did not reserve the right
to remove.54
53 Id.
54 An open question that has remained since Shelley v. Kramer, but one that this
Note does not address, is: If a court enforcing the racially restrictive covenants at issue
in Shelley would have violated the Constitution by doing so, does a court similarly
violate the Constitution if it enforces contract terms that restrict speech beyond the
bounds that a legislature would be able to, even though it is permissible for parties to
contract to such terms?  So far courts have declined to extend the Shelley holding
beyond the bounds of that general fact pattern.  There are most likely strong and
sound policy reasons for courts to decline to extend the holding beyond the racially
restrictive covenants in the housing context.  Nevertheless, the logical consequence of
that holding could seemingly restrict judicial enforcement of contract terms that a
legislature could not prescribe without constitutional scrutiny. See PATRICIA L. BELLIA
ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
158 (4th ed. 2011) (“Shelley’s logic ‘consistently applied, would require individuals to
conform their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as almost
always, the individuals might later seek the security of potential judicial enforce-
ment.’” (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed.
1988)).
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II. THE EFFECT OF ROBUST PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNET CONTEXT
A. The Substance and Form of Contracts on the Internet
There are two main types of contracts a user will encounter on
the Internet: “browsewrap” contracts and “clickwrap” contracts.  Brow-
sewrap contracts are passive forms of displaying and asserting the
Terms of Service.55  A website will display a link, usually on its
homepage or other prominent page, that will take the user to the
Terms of Service agreement.56  The Terms of Service will usually state
that by simply using the website, the user agrees to be bound by the
stated terms which outline acceptable use of the site and any legal
rights the website owner and operators reserve.57  If the user does not
want to accept the terms, her only option is to cease using that site.
“Clickwrap” contracts embody more classical aspects of contract
formation, but this is more in form rather than substance.58  With
clickwrap contracts a user will be required to click an “I Accept” but-
ton or box before she is able to continue using the site or before she
can download software.59  This puts the user on more formal notice
that she is being bound by a Terms of Service agreement.  It has been
widely noted that very few users actually read such agreements or fol-
low the “terms” link on a webpage.60  But courts have generally deter-
mined that, so long as the user is on notice that terms exist, failure to
55 See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006) (describing
browsewrap contracts as ones “in which the user does not see the contract at all but in
which the license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a con-
tract whether the user knows it or not”).
56 See id.
57 See, e.g., Terms of Service, GOOGLE, (last modified Mar. 1, 2012), https://www
.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (“By using our services, you are agreeing to
these terms.”).
58 Lemley, supra note 55, at 466 (stating that the formalities of clickwrap con-
tracts stretch the traditional notions of a bargained-for exchange with a manifestation
of assent since “they substitute a blanket, take-it-or-leave-it assent for the classical
notion that the parties actually thought about and agreed to the terms of the deal”).
59 Id.
60 See id. at 463; see also 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls,
FOXNEWS (April 15, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2010/04/15/online-shop-
pers-unknowingly-sold-souls/ (reporting that the online retailer GameStation
updated their Terms of Service on April Fools’ Day 2010 to include an “immortal soul
clause” as a spoof about how “[n]o one reads the online terms and conditions”); Matt
Warman, Will You Read Google’s New Privacy Policy?, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 26, 2012, 7:00
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/9039551/Will-you-read-Goog-
les-new-privacy-policy.html (“[Y]ou’re asked merely to confirm that you’ve read [the
Terms and Conditions], even though you almost certainly haven’t.”).
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read the Terms of Service does not excuse the user from being bound
under those terms.61
B. Judicial Deference and the Robust Right of Freedom to Contract
Thus far in its development, Internet contract jurisprudence is
marked by a strong deference to the enforceability of these types of
online contracts.62  Initially these relatively new types of contract for-
mation received a fair amount of judicial scrutiny.  In Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp.,63 the Second Circuit determined that an arbitra-
tion clause in a license agreement was unenforceable because the way
Netscape presented the terms did not put the user on proper notice
that the user was assenting to those terms.64  The court stated that the
“contractual nature [of the terms] [was] not obvious” and that the
plaintiffs were “unaware that the defendant intended to attach license
terms to the use of [the downloaded software].”65  While this case is
still good law, there are differentiating factors of the Netscape license
agreement that explain why courts do not generally reach the same
result in ruling on the validity of more current Terms of Service agree-
ments.  In Specht, the user downloaded free software after receiving a
prompt or advertisement, but there was no indication to the user that
there were terms contained in another window, nor did the software
require that the user “accept” the terms by clicking a button.66  The
court held that the mere act of downloading the software did not con-
stitute acceptance of the license terms because the user did not have
notice that such terms existed.67
Today, companies cure this procedural infirmity by providing a
box or button that the user must click when he or she signs up for the
service indicating agreement to the Terms of Service.  In Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc.,68 the court distinguished the Netscape license agree-
ment in Specht from the Facebook Terms of Service by noting that
Facebook’s “second Sign-Up page’s reference to the Terms of Use
appeared immediately below the ‘Sign-Up’ button,”69 whereas in
61 See infra Section II.B.
62 See generally Cohen, supra note 16, at 463–97 (comparing the current Internet
contract regime to the Lochner era of contract ideology and jurisprudence).
63 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
64 Id. at 20.
65 Id. at 31–32 (second alteration in original) (quoting Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Col-
lins Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (1972)).
66 Id. at 21–22.
67 Id. at 32, 35.
68 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
69 Id. at 835.
960 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
Specht, the agreement required the user to scroll down before the
term at issue was noticeable.70  In Fteja, the user “was informed of the
consequences of his assenting click and he was shown, immediately
below, where to click to understand those consequences.”71  Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that, because social networking users are savvy
enough to know what a hyperlink labeled “Terms of Service” will con-
tain, failure to click on the hyperlink and read the terms simply means
that the user has failed to inform herself of the contract obligations.72
The court in Fteja offered the opinion that “courts appear to share
[the view that clicking ‘I Agree’ is a manifestation of assent], for
[c]lickwrap agreements ‘have been routinely upheld by circuit and
district courts.’”73  In dicta, the court in Fteja went on to note a differ-
ence between Terms of Service agreements, where the user must click
a button to assent to the terms, and pure browsewrap agreements,
where “the user does not see the contract at all but in which the
license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a
contract whether the user knows it or not.”74  The court did not opine
if it would have held a browsewrap agreement to be unenforceable
since that type of agreement was not at issue in the case.  Other
courts, however, have held even browsewrap agreements to be
enforceable despite the very informal nature of “notice” and “accept-
ance” in that form.75
The current regime of contract enforcement on the Internet
appears to go beyond a simple adherence to the facial formalities of
classic contract law.  Several commentators have noted that a strong
deference to the agreements of private parties underlies the decisions
70 Specht, 306 F.3d at 31–32.
71 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 837 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Drew, 259
F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009)).
74 Id. at 837 (quoting Lemley, supra note 55, at 460) (internal quotations marks
omitted).
75 See id. at 836–39 (summarizing a range of cases that have held browsewrap
contracts to be enforceable generally, and specifically the kind of forum selection
clause at issue in Fteja).  One commentator has suggested that a court may be more
likely to deem a business user to be on notice of a browsewrap agreement where they
might not deem an individual user to be on notice based on the difference of sophisti-
cation. See Lemley, supra note 55, at 477 (positing that the “awareness” of contract
terms necessary to make them binding “may be more likely with corporations than
individuals, perhaps because . . . they themselves employ terms of use and therefore
should expect that others will”).
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to uphold these procedurally weak methods of contract formation.76
Professor Cohen has likened current Internet contract jurisprudence
to that of the highly deferential contract jurisprudence in the Loch-
ner77 era.  She argues that the same premises of “the sanctity of private
property and freedom of contract, [and] the sharply delimited role of
public policy in shaping private transactions” are present in “scholar-
ship concerning the relative superiority . . . of common law property
and contract rules.”78  Professor Radin and Professor Wagner note
that the arguments for the clear superiority of private ordering in the
Internet context stem from a “stylized distinction between bottom-up
and top-down ordering.”79  These types of comments speak not just to
the procedure of contract formation, but also to any potential terms
within the contract.  Because courts, and Internet businesses, most
often view private ordering as a way for a complicated web of people
to organize their obligations to each other, a court is going to be very
hesitant to engage in scrutiny of the substantive terms unless they are
egregious.  There are sound policy reasons for this deference since
courts are less likely than an Internet speech forum provider to know
the precise challenges that a global business like Google faces.  Thus,
so long as a term is not facially unconscionable, it is likely that courts
simply do not think it is their role to heavily scrutinize the content of
these agreements.80
When taken together, these comments describe a system of con-
tract where the scales tip heavily in favor of private ordering because it
represents an efficient market at work and a system where the party
76 See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Redis-
covering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1998) (“Some
advocates of private ordering . . . argue that cyberspace must either be governed
entirely by state-backed law or entirely by non-legal (anarchic) norms, then vote for
the latter.”).
77 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
78 Cohen, supra note 16, at 464.
79 Radin & Wagner, supra note 76, at 1297.
80 The substantive contract terms courts have been willing to scrutinize mainly
pertain to a party’s ability to seek legal redress, rather than a term relating to what the
user can or cannot do with the product or what action the business can or cannot take
in regards to content. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D.
Pa. 2007) (applying California state law and finding substantive unconscionability due
to lack of mutuality); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174–77 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (applying California state law and finding substantive unconscionability due to
lack of mutuality in part because Paypal reserves the right to alter or amend the provi-
sions while the user is subject to these provisions so long as they are a customer);
Brower v. Gateway, 246 A.D.2d 246, 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (finding that the “por-
tion of the arbitration provision requiring arbitration before the ICC to be uncon-
scionable” and remanding for further proceedings).
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proffering the standard form contract only needs to follow basic for-
malities to create a binding “agreement” that lowers friction for both
the customer and business.  While this slant towards enforceability
may be justified by a desire to keep transaction costs on the Internet
as low as possible in order to facilitate growth,81 the effect of this def-
erential ideology is that users have a steep uphill battle challenging
these kinds of contracts in court.
The result is that if our hypothetical YouTube user from the
example above wanted to challenge YouTube’s removal of her con-
tent, she would face a body of common law on contracts and a defer-
ential stance that favor both the enforceability of the contract
formation and its substantive terms.  Under the current regime just
described it is unlikely—though certainly not impossible depending
on the circumstances—that a user would prevail in a Terms of Service
challenge.
III. TERMS OF SERVICE AS A SHIELD TO CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
A. First Amendment Primacy in Government Direct Action
When the government directly acts in response to or against
speech, such as a government actor firing a public employee for
remarks made on the Internet, the use of a contract-governed speech
forum does not appear to alter the court’s First Amendment analy-
sis.82  The broader form of government action against speech is legis-
81 Lemley, supra note 55, at 465 (noting that standard form contracts “can serve
useful purposes in reducing transaction costs in mass-market, repeat-play settings”).
82 See Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215(JLH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126665, at *10 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011) (holding that although the Facebook postings
at issue took place “primarily to further [the plaintiff’s] private interest in receiving
emotional support and affirmation,” the speaker “does not give up her right to free
speech simply because her speech is private” (quoting Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589,
595 (8th Cir. 2002))).  The more troubling analysis has been when the court engages
in the question of whether something done on the Internet counts as a “[ ]sufficient
speech to merit constitutional protection.”  Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603
(E.D. Va. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013).  In Bland, the
district court held that someone “liking” a page on Facebook (in that case it was a
political candidate’s Facebook page) did not “involve[ ] actual statements” and that
“liking” a page “is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted
constitutional protection.” Id. at 604.  While the plaintiff contended that “liking” the
page “was a statement of support,” the court states that they would “not attempt to
infer the actual content of [plaintiff’s] posts from one click of a button on [the candi-
date’s] Facebook page.” Id. at 603–04.  The media attention this holding received
indicates that most users’ intuitions about what is occurring when they are “liking”
something on Facebook is that they are manifesting their assent and are performing a
legally cognizable speech act. See, e.g., Mary Quinn O’Connor, Lawyer Vows to Appeal
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lation, but thus far there have been few attempts from Congress or the
states to expressly limit speech content on the Internet through legis-
lation.  Those that have been enacted have been generally unsuccess-
ful.  Most notably, in Reno v. ACLU,83 the Supreme Court of the
United States invalidated the indecency provisions of the Communica-
tions Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) for being overbroad.84  The CDA
made criminal the “knowing transmission of obscene or indecent
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.”85  Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, noted that, “the many ambiguities concern-
ing the scope of the [CDA’s] coverage render it problematic for the
purposes of the First Amendment.”86  Through this ruling, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that what takes place on the Internet
can be protected speech, and that any congressional attempts to regu-
late speech on the Internet will receive full First Amendment scru-
tiny.87  Provisions in the Providers’ Terms of Service that already
restricted the dissemination of the content targeted by the CDA
received no attention in the Court’s analysis of the constitutionality of
the statute.88
B. Primacy of Contract Law and Terms of Service in Government Indirect
Action Through Forum Providers
Given that the courts apply First Amendment constitutional scru-
tiny to direct government action that limits speech on the Internet
(either through legislation like the CDA or through a tort action for
retaliation for speech), the movement of speech from the metaphori-
cal and literal town square to the contract-governed space of
Facebook, Twitter, or Google has not substantially affected users’
Ruling That Says Facebook ‘Like’ is Not Free Speech, FOXNEWS (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www
.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/14/lawyer-vows-to-appeal-runling-that-facebook-like-
is-not-free-speech/; Jeff John Roberts, Facebook Says ‘Likes’ Are Free Speech in Sheriff Case,
GIGAOM, (Aug. 7, 2012, 9:23 AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/08/07/facebook-says-
likes-are-free-speech-in-sheriff-case/; Joanna Stern, Is a Facebook ‘Like’ Protected Under
the First Amendment?, ABC NEWS, (August 9, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/technology/2012/08/is-a-facebook-like-protected-under-the-first-amendment/.
The Fourth Circuit has since disagreed with the district court and stated that “[o]nce
one understands the nature of what [the plaintiff] did by liking the campaign page, it
becomes apparent that his conduct qualifies as speech,” and described clicking the
like button as “pure speech” and “symbolic expression.” Bland, 730 F.3d at 386.
83 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 859.
86 Id. at 871.
87 Id. at 874–75, 877–78.
88 Id. at 850–51.
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rights in those kinds of cases.  The user is directly aware of the govern-
ment’s interference, either through the criminal sanction or through
the job termination, and so the user can challenge that interference.
The Terms of Service play little role, if any, in the analysis.  When the
government acts indirectly, however, through a request made to the
Internet speech forum provider, the Terms of Service stand in
between the speakers and the governmental actor.
1. Indirection Action and the Role of Forum Providers
Social media platforms and search engines regularly include in
their Terms of Service a provision reserving the right to remove con-
tent for various purposes.89  Usually an Internet speech forum pro-
89 The following is a snapshot of various content removal reservations in the
Terms of Service of popular sites.
Bing:
When you upload your content to the services, you agree that it may be used,
modified, adapted, saved, reproduced, distributed, and displayed to the
extent necessary to protect you and to provide, protect and improve
Microsoft products and services.  For example, we may occasionally use auto-
mated means to isolate information from email, chats, or photos in order to
help detect and protect against spam and malware, or to improve the ser-
vices with new features that makes them easier to use.
Microsoft Services Agreement, BING, § 3.3 (effective Oct. 19, 2012), http://windows.micro
soft.com/en-US/windows-live/microsoft-services-agreement.  The Bing Terms of Ser-
vice further state:
We may ask you to remove your content from the services if it violates this
agreement or the law.  Failure to comply may result in loss of access to, or
cancellation of, the services or your Microsoft account.  Additionally,
Microsoft may remove your content without asking you if we determine it’s
in violation of this agreement or the law, or if we receive a notice of intellec-
tual property infringement from a third party.
Id. § 3.6.
Facebook:
If you violate the letter or spirit of this Statement, or otherwise create risk or
possible legal exposure for us, we can stop providing all or part of Facebook
to you.  We will notify you by email or at the next time you attempt to access
your account.
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (last modified Dec. 11, 2012), https://
www.facebook.com/legal/terms.
Google:
We may review content to determine whether it is illegal or violates our poli-
cies, and we may remove or refuse to display content that we reasonably
believe violates our policies or the law . . . .  When you upload or otherwise
submit content to our Services, you give Google (and those we work with) a
worldwide license to use, host, store, reproduce, modify, create derivative
works (such as those resulting from translations, adaptations or other
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vider will reserve the right to remove content that infringes on
copyrights, that violates the community standards guidelines for
acceptable use, or that violates a local law.90  There is often a provision
allowing users to make removal requests to the Internet speech forum
provider.91  Although the forums do not provide much data about
take-down requests or forum violation reports they receive, the
Google transparency report provides one small glimpse, revealing that
these requests can come from a number of sources—mainly other
users, affected parties, or the government.92  Based on Google’s
report, government take-down requests most commonly take the form
of a court order or a request from an executive branch, law enforce-
ment agency, or police department.93  The take-down system is on the
whole a complaint-based system where the forum provider reacts to
requests received rather than proactively monitoring content.94
changes we make so that your content works better with our Services), com-
municate, publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute such
content.
Terms of Service, GOOGLE (last modified Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.google.com/intl/
en/policies/terms/.
Twitter:
We reserve the right at all times (but will not have an obligation) to remove
or refuse to distribute any Content on the Services, to suspend or terminate
users, and to reclaim usernames without liability to you.  We also reserve the
right to access, read, preserve, and disclose any information as we reasonably
believe is necessary to (i) satisfy any applicable law, regulation, legal process
or governmental request, (ii) enforce the Terms, including investigation of
potential violations hereof, (iii) detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud,
security or technical issues, (iv) respond to user support requests, or (v) pro-
tect the rights, property or safety of Twitter, its users and the public.
Terms of Service, TWITTER (effective June 25, 2012), https://twitter.com/tos.  For the
guidelines of Facebook permissible uses, violation of which could prompt take-down
or termination measures, see Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.face
book.com/communitystandards (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
90 See supra note 89.
91 See, e.g., How to Report Violations, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/
groups/33-report-abuse-or-policy-violations/topics/122-reporting-violations/articles/
15789-how-to-report-violations# (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (outlining the procedures
that a user must go through to submit a report of a violation).
92 Transparency Report, From Governments, FAQ, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/government/faq/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
93 Id.
94 Id.  The sole exception to the transparency report and removal request proce-
dures Google lists is for child pornography.  Google states it has systems in place to
identify and remove such content as soon as Google is made aware of its existence.
Id. (“[Google’s] policies and systems are set up to identify and remove child pornog-
raphy whenever [Google] become[s] aware of it, regardless of whether that request
comes from the government.”).
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Google releases a semiannual “transparency report” intended to
provide the public with a better understanding of who is requesting
content removal and for what purposes.  The rough breakdown tracks
both copyright removal requests and government removal requests.95
Of the government removal requests, Google groups the requests as
either emanating from “Court Orders” or from “Executive, Police,
etc.”96  The report categorizes the requests by Google product97 and
the reason for the request.98  A single request can ask for multiple
items to be removed, so Google tracks both requests made and items
actually removed.99
Focusing on the government take-down requests—which include
court orders, as well as informal requests from the executive branch
and law enforcement—from July to December of 2009, Google fully
or partially complied with 80% of the 123 removal requests it
received.100  From January to June 2010, Google complied with 83%
of 128 removal requests.101  This rose to the high water mark of 87%
compliance, with 54 take-down requests, from July to December
2010.102  The percentage of compliance has dramatically decreased as
content removal requests have steeply increased.  From January to
June 2011, Google received 92 requests to have a total of 757 items
removed, and it partially or fully complied with 63% of the
requests.103  For the remainder of 2011, Google received 187 requests
to have 6192 items removed and it partially or fully complied with
95 Transparency Report, From Governments, United States, Overview, GOOGLE, http://
www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/US/ (last visited Oct.
26, 2013).
96 Id.
97 List of products Google cites: Web Search, Google Earth, Google Maps,
Panoramio, Google Places, Google Groups, Google+, YouTube, Blogger, Google Sites,
Google Adwords, Gmail, Google Apps. Id.
98 List of reasons Google provides: defamation, privacy and security, other, vio-
lence, pornography, copyright, trademark, national security, and impersonation. Id.
99 Id.
100 Each removal request can contain multiple individual items of content to be
removed.  However, there can be multiple requests within the six-month period to
have a single content item removed, and the data as reported does not distinguish
that circumstance.  Thus this data provides an interesting, rough snapshot into the
volume of requests and compliance, but precise delineations from the data are not
advisable. Transparency Report, From Governments, United States, By Compliance Rate,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/US/?
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42% of the take-down requests.104  In the first half of 2012, Google
received requests to have 4167 items removed, which is an increase of
46% compared to the second half of 2011.105  Google partially or fully
complied with 45% of these requests.106  Google noted the same com-
pliance rate, 45%, for the second half of 2012.107
The transparency report does “not include content removals that
[Google] regularly process[es] every day . . . across [Google’s] prod-
ucts for violation of [its] content policies . . .  (for example, [Google]
do[es] not permit hate speech in Blogger and other similar prod-
ucts)” in response to user complaints.108  Although Google provides a
rough outline of the purpose of the content removal request and the
type of governmental entity that requests it, Google does not provide
information about which requests in particular it did or did not com-
ply with.  As a result, this Note cannot draw any conclusions about the
type of requests Google more regularly complies with and from
whom.
2. The Burden Shifts to Users and Forum Providers
By using any of Google’s (or Facebook’s or Twitter’s, etc.) ser-
vices, the user agrees to allow Google to make a judgment about
whether certain content will be removed.  Rather than engaging with
the speaker directly and issuing the court order or request for removal
to the speaker,109 the government has the choice simply to go to
Google and make its take-down request to the company.110  The pro-
vider may choose not to comply.  Most Terms of Service agreements,
104 Id.
105 Transparency Report, From Government, United States, By Items, GOOGLE, http://
www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/US/?metric=items (last
visited Oct. 26, 2013).
106 Transparency Report, By Government, United States, By Compliance Rate, supra note
100.
107 Id.
108 Transparency Report, From Governments, FAQ, supra note 92.  If Google were to
remove content that it deemed to be hate speech on the request of a user, such a
removal would not be included in the transparency report.
109 Based on the Terms of Service of the most popular platforms, most users do
have the power and right to delete their own content. See supra note 89.
110 There may be policy and practical reasons why a police agency or government
actor would choose to go through the Internet forum provider rather than engage
with the speaker directly.  For example, if someone posted an opinion or rumor that
the government believes could threaten national security or would threaten an ongo-
ing criminal investigation, they may not want the user to know that it was their partic-
ular agency that requested the content to be removed.  Thus Google could provide an
anonymity shield for the government actor.
968 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
however, state that the provider will comply with lawful processes.111
Any speech forum provider will most likely be operating within the
scope of its Terms of Service agreement if it complies with a court
order.112  If the Internet speech forum provider decides it should not
comply with the court order, it will have to push back on its own initia-
tive since the court order will not have been made to the user directly.
Obviously an Internet speech forum provider does not have to choose
to push back against such a court order and could easily comply with
all the ones they receive.  As a result, any decision an Internet speech
forum provider makes on whether to take legal action in contraven-
tion of a court order, or not to comply with an informal request from
the government, will reflect some independent policy the company
has already adopted or intends to adopt.113
A company would have to have sufficient market incentives to be
discerning about which court orders it chooses to comply with and
which ones it does not.  Ultimately, while the practical effect of the
request may be the same, compliance or noncompliance with the
request, the legal remedies available to the user are significantly
altered when the government chooses to make its request to the pro-
vider rather than to the user directly.114  If the government
approaches the user directly and requests that the user remove con-
tent she has posted or presents a court order requiring removal, then
the user, not the Internet speech forum provider, can choose not to
comply and deal with the consequences; the user can subsequently
raise her speech rights as a defense to the removal order; or the user
can sue the government for a First Amendment violation.  With no
Terms of Service to deflect the inquiry, all of these avenues would
provide the user an opportunity to challenge the government’s action
directly and potentially within a constitutional framework.
111 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Oct. 26,
2013) (“We reserve the right at all times (but will not have an obligation) to remove
. . . any Content on the Services . . . . We also reserve the right to access, read, pre-
serve, and disclose any information we reasonably believe is necessary to (i) satisfy any
applicable law, regulation, legal process or governmental request . . . .”).
113 Unless of course a company is acting arbitrarily with regard to these requests,
or on a whim, which is highly unlikely given the nature of the requests involved.  If a
company has little time and resources to devote to reviewing the requests, the more
likely scenario is that the company will simply comply with all requests received.
114 See infra subsections III.B.3–4.
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3. The Insufficiency of the Contract Remedies Available
By making the take-down request to Google or any Internet
speech forum provider, the government does not directly act upon
the speaker.  If the Internet speech forum provider chooses to comply
with the request and the user notices the content is missing and wants
to challenge the Internet speech forum provider’s action, the court’s
analysis will be rooted in the relationship between the user and the
Internet speech forum provider.115  The court will analyze whether,
under the Terms of Service, the Internet speech forum provider
reserved the right to remove the content.  Since an Internet speech
forum provider like Google or Twitter is not a state actor, the user will
have to challenge the Internet speech forum provider’s removal of the
content under a contract theory.116  The user’s ability to vindicate his
or her rights under a contract theory will be limited, both by the
causes of action available and the court’s history of strong deference
to contract terms.117  Under this approach, users will be limited to (a)
challenging the Internet speech forum provider’s power to remove
the content under the contract, (b) arguing the procedural or sub-
stantive unconscionability of the contract terms or the underlying
contract itself, or (c) contending that the terms should be void for
reason of public policy.
First, the user could argue that the terms of the contract did not
include the authority to remove the kind of content at issue.  Most
Internet speech forum providers have some version of a “community
standards” policy that governs the limits of acceptable activity on the
site.118  Facebook’s policy, for example, reserves the right to remove
content in the following categories: violence and threats, self-harm,
bullying and harassment, hate speech, graphic content, nudity and
pornography, identity and privacy, intellectual property, and phishing
115 See Berman, supra note 32, at 1265–66 (“[I]f America Online wishes to censor
a user’s speech from its chatrooms, it can simply eliminate the user’s on-line privi-
leges, regardless of whether the First Amendment would protect that speech.”).
116 Id. at 1267–68.  Professor Berman notes that in Cyber Promotions v. America
Online, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the court rested its reasoning in part on the
idea that American Online was “not the state and therefore . . . not subject to the
commands of the First Amendment.”  Berman, supra note 32, at 1267–68.  This is an
example of how the state action doctrine “poses a significant challenge to those who
see private regulatory power as a threat to individual rights and public discourse
online.” Id. at 1268.
117 See supra Part II.
118 See supra note 89.
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and spam.119  Each category is accompanied by a definition of the
offending activity.  For example, concerning hate speech, Facebook
provides that “[w]hile we encourage you to challenge ideas, institu-
tions, events and practices, we do not permit individuals or groups to
attack others based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion,
sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or medical condition.”120
“Attack” is not defined, so this could turn out to be a broad discretion-
ary reservation.121  The user would have to argue that the removed
content could not reasonably be interpreted as constituting one of
these categories.  This argument is unlikely to be successful given the
fairly broad reservation of removal power122 and the robust deference
to freedom of contract most courts have displayed.123
Next, a user could argue that the contract term, or that the con-
tract as a whole, was procedurally unconscionable.  As discussed in
Part II, however, this is a difficult avenue for any user to pursue,
because courts have generally held both browsewrap and clickwrap
contracts to be enforceable.  Given that forum providers take care to
present their Terms of Service agreements in such a way as to cure the
procedural issues present in early Internet contract cases such as
Specht, users challenging the Terms of Service on procedural grounds
face a formidable task.124
The user could also argue that contract terms that substantially
limit his or her free speech, especially political speech, should be
unenforceable due to public policy.  The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts provides that a provision is unenforceable on public policy
grounds “if . . . the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in
the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such
terms.”125  In weighing the circumstances that could lead to voiding
the term, courts take account of “the parties’ justified expectations”
and “any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular
119 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystand
ards (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (“[T]hese standards . . . will help you understand what
type of expression is acceptable, and what type of content may be reported and
removed.”).
120 Id.
121 Or Facebook may be interpreting this reservation narrowly.  However, due to
the lack of transparency the public cannot know what the extent of this reservation of
removal power is or how Facebook is exercising it.  And even if Facebook itself inter-
prets this narrowly, a court might not.
122 See supra note 89.
123 See supra Part II.
124 See supra Part II.
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
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term.”126  A user could attempt to argue that shifting speech norms—
most notably a common shift to speech expression in contract-gov-
erned spaces—implicate a need to hold terms that could have a chil-
ling effect on speech to greater scrutiny.127  Given, however, the vast
responsibility that Internet speech forum providers have in maintain-
ing a space that serves a global base of users, limiting the provider’s
ability to comply with local law enforcement on an international scale
might be unduly burdensome on the provider, and thus public policy
would probably cut against the user-speech argument.  The difficulty
of the public policy considerations present in the Internet speech con-
text is coupled with the high burden required for holding a contract
term void for public policy.128  Given Internet forums’ relative novelty
and given the potentially strong countervailing arguments for keeping
speech restricting provisions intact, these arguments are unlikely to be
successful for a user challenging the substance of the terms in a Terms
of Service agreement.
4. Contract Law as a Replacement for First Amendment Scrutiny
This Note has shown that a user will have to attempt to vindicate
her right not to have content removed through the filter of the Terms
of Service.  There are two key implications to this: (1) the burden has
effectively shifted to the user to demonstrate his or her ability to post
the speech under the Terms of Service, rather than a focus on the
power of the government to remove such content; and (2) the change
in the legal framework under which the claim will be analyzed from
First Amendment scrutiny to a contract law analysis will make it very
difficult for a speaker to win.
If an Internet speech forum provider decides not to comply with
a government take-down request, it will have to take the action of chal-
126 Id. § 178(2)(a), (c).
127 Professor Radin has proposed that legal decision makers should give great
scrutiny to any contractual provision that waives legal rights in the following catego-
ries: “(1) rights related to legal enforcement; (2) human rights; (3) rights that are
politically weak.”  Radin, supra note 16, at 9.
128 See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 643–47, 654–58 (6th
ed. 2007) (explaining that “there is a strong public interest in the freedom to contract
and there must be a well established basis for any public policy that would deny
enforcement of a contract”).  Generally public policy arguments have been in the
context of restraints on trade, restraints on legal and medical practices, reasonable-
ness of the covenant, family relations, and legislative declarations. Id. at 642–46,
654–55.  Private limitations on free speech would appear to be a new area for this
argument.
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lenging the validity of the government request.129  There is some evi-
dence that Internet speech forum providers have chosen to do so, but
there is little information available regarding these requests.  Google
occasionally provides anecdotal evidence of its pushback against such
requests.  For example, in the January to June 2012 report Google
stated that they “received five requests and one court order to remove
seven YouTube videos for criticizing local and state government agen-
cies, law enforcement or public officials.  We did not remove content
in response to these requests.”130  The Google report does not men-
tion if the user was notified that such a request had been made.  Fur-
ther, because requests such as these are made to the Internet speech
forum provider and not the user, any dispute over the validity of the
take-down request (which could often implicate First Amendment
rights in addition to simple procedural mistakes on the part of the
government) will take place between the Internet speech forum pro-
vider and the government, not the speaker and the government.
Because of the shift to the Terms of Service regime, users of these
popular forums are no longer in a position to subject the govern-
ment’s action to constitutional scrutiny.  If the action the Internet
speech forum provider took in removing the user’s content was consis-
tent with a valid and enforceable contract, and if a user challenges in
court that removal of content, the user’s speech will not be analyzed
in light of the First Amendment, but rather under general contract
principles.  If the government makes the request to the Internet
speech forum provider, it will be the Internet speech forum provider,
rather than the user, who challenges the government action.  The
problem with this process is that the forum provider has a very differ-
ent stake in the outcome of the action than the individual speaker.  As
a result, a governmental actor may be able to remove more content by
interacting with the service provider than it would by approaching the
user.  This informal process has the potential to broaden the practical
reach of the government without subjecting its action to appropriate
scrutiny.131  Effectively, the government can send its request through
129 See, e.g., infra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
130 Google Transparency Report, January to June 2012, GOOGLE, http://www.google
.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/US/?p=2012-06 (last visited Oct.
26, 2013).
131 Given the anecdotal evidence that Google provides in its Transparency Report,
it seems as if such overbroad requests may already be taking place.  “[Google]
received five requests and one court order to remove seven YouTube videos for criti-
cizing local and state government agencies . . . .  We did not remove content in
response to these requests.” Id.  The anecdotes do not contain much factual detail
and only very few anecdotes are given.  From the standpoint of the general public, it is
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the washing machine that is the forum provider’s Terms of Service
and the court’s state action doctrine, and it will emerge on the other
end as a simple contract claim.
IV. THE TERMS OF SERVICE REGIME AND
CONSTITUTIONAL VINDICATION
A. Transparency and Market Incentives
One of the key problems with the current system is that, as the
general public, we do not know if the requests the government has
been making are constitutionally valid or not.  And although Google’s
Transparency Report has all the indicia of a company sensibly shoul-
dering a responsibility, we do not know if it is making the same
pushback choices that those whose speech is implicated would make.
As limited as the Google Transparency Report is, Google is one of the
only Internet speech forum providers that even creates and dissemi-
nates such a report.  The majority of Internet speech forum providers
do not disclose the requests they have received and the action they
took on those requests.132  All of the companies involved might be
acting reasonably given the circumstances.  Without more trans-
parency or constitutional scrutiny, however, we do not know if there
have been requests made and carried out that, if the governmental
actor had made them directly to the user, would have infringed on the
user’s First Amendment rights.
Thus far, Internet speech forums and search engines have shown
they are trying to balance competing global interests.  Such compet-
ing interests include protecting children and accommodating domes-
tic government interests as well as differing international legal
standards.133  Through pursuing key litigation on behalf of users, fil-
ing amicus briefs, and providing transparency reports, Twitter,
hard to know how broad or reasonable such government requests may be, or how
frequent they may be.
132 Interestingly, in the related context of user information and privacy, rather
than removal of user postings, many of the Internet forums expressed a desire to be
able to disclose publicly information about government requests for user information.
See John Koetsier, The Full PRISM Letter Google, Yahoo, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft are
Sending Congress, VENTUREBEAT (July 18, 2013, 12:23 PM), http://venturebeat.com/
2013/07/18/the-full-prism-letter-google-yahoo-apple-facebook-and-microsoft-are-
sending-congress/ (noting that many companies have asked for “greater transparency
on PRISM, NSA surveillance of Americans, and government requests for data about
their customers”).
133 For example, see Facebook’s community standards page. Community Standards,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards (last visited, Oct. 4,
2013).
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Facebook, and Google have manifested a desire to preserve a robust
speech culture on their forums.134  For example, in an attempt to bal-
ance the differing global speech norms, Facebook provides a “commu-
nity standards” list that is quite similar to the types of restrictions one
might find in a homeowners’ association handbook.135  When one
considers the over one billion users Facebook had as of October 4,
2012,136 having a community standards policy seems to be a fair way to
balance competing free speech norms in a global community.
In addition to setting these standards, even when an Internet
speech forum provider is not a party to a case that arose on its plat-
form, it often has a strong interest in the judicial determinations that
result from controversies arising on its forums.137  In Bland v. Rob-
erts,138 the district court in the Eastern District of Virginia held that a
user clicking the “like” button was not speech.139  In its amicus brief to
the Fourth Circuit, Facebook argued that “liking” something on
Facebook is indeed speech because of the way the action manifests the
user’s opinion on the forum.140  Facebook also asserted that in gen-
eral it “has a vital interest in ensuring that speech on Facebook and in
other online communities is afforded the same constitutional protection
as speech in newspapers, on television, and in the town square.”141
134 See supra Part II & Section III.B.
135 For a more in-depth discussion of the similarity of common interest communi-
ties and virtual worlds, see Jason S. Zack, Note, The Ultimate Company Town: Wading in
the Digital Marsh of Second Life, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 (2007) (arguing that Second
Life serves substantially the same functions to its users that a company-owned town
does to its residents, and thus Second Life users should be afforded some constitu-
tional protections).
136 Barbara Ortutay, Facebook Tops 1 Billion Users, USA TODAY (Oct. 4 2012, 4:44
PM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/10/04/facebook-tops-1-billion-
users/1612613/.
137 See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
138 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012).
139 Id. at 603 (“It is the Court’s conclusion that merely ‘liking’ a Facebook page is
insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”).
140 Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant
Daniel Ray Carter Jr. And in Support of Vacatur at 5–7, Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368
(4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1671), 2013 WL 5228033 [hereinafter Facebook Amicus
Brief] (explaining how the “like” button generates content on Facebook “newsfeeds”
and how that content manifests a connection between the user the item “liked”).  On
appeal the Fourth Circuit quoted with approval the Facebook Amicus Brief for its
explanation of what message a “like” sends and how the system disseminates that mes-
sage. Bland, 730 F.3d at 385, 386.  The Fourth Circuit found that in light of the expla-
nation “it becomes apparent that [liking a Facebook page] qualifies as speech.” Id. at
386.
141 Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 7 (emphasis added).
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While these efforts and sentiments may be welcome, ultimately
we as a polity should consider if in fact we want the operators of these
Internet communities to have to shoulder the responsibility and the
burden of guarding free speech on the Internet.  Should Google’s
lawyers have to make these judgment calls about which court orders it
should comply with and which take-down requests are reasonable on
behalf of the user?  Is it optimal for the marketplace of ideas that
these Internet communities often have to shoulder the burden of
speech related litigation?  For example, if at the request of a govern-
ment entity Google takes down certain content and the user wants to
challenge it, the user will have to challenge Google’s actions under
the Terms of Service rather than sue the government directly.142  This
places a financial burden on the Internet forums of having to be the
intermediary, not just for purposes of the requests, but also with
respect to subsequent litigation that might arise.
In light of these developments, the key consideration is whether
there are sufficient market incentives for Internet speech forum prov-
iders to continue to push back against government encroachments on
user speech.  One such market incentive would be a clear business
advantage to being perceived as a forum provider with robust speech
policies.  Given that users and public commentators have so fre-
quently raised the issue of speech rights, it is highly likely that Internet
speech forum providers will want to provide a product that its con-
sumers feel protects their speech norms.143
Conversely, an Internet speech forum provider might decide the
cost of pushing back against such government requests is too high and
so decides to comply with most requests.  It is unclear whether these
sorts of incentives are going to encourage the kind of action on the
part of the Internet speech forum provider that would approximate
the level of protection a speaker would receive if the government were
to act against the speaker directly under the First Amendment.  The
lack of transparency in the industry regarding take-down requests and
government action seems to suggest that currently it is in the Internet
speech forum provider’s best business interest not to make this infor-
mation public, though it may not be in the user’s best interest.  The
reasons for this could be that Internet speech forum providers worry
about consumer backlash in instances where the Internet speech
142 See supra Part III.
143 See Facebook Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 1 (stating that Facebook seeks to
provide a product “in which Users can engage in debate and advocate for the political
ideas, parties, and candidates of their choice”).
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forum provider chose to comply or the provider has concern for inter-
national implications of differing speech norms and laws.
There are a few cases in the privacy context, most notably People
v. Harris,144 where an Internet speech forum provider—in that case
Twitter—chose to push back against a subpoena and subsequent judi-
cial determination that it felt was contrary to Twitter’s corporate
objectives.  Currently, speech issues, and even privacy issues, are still
very much unsettled law.  So long as new and favorable determina-
tions can still be won—such as Facebook advocating for a ruling that
the “like” button is speech—Internet speech forum providers have an
incentive to stay in the fight.  Once the law becomes more settled, and
if the emerging doctrine cuts against Internet speech forum provid-
ers’ interests, these providers may no longer see the benefit in con-
stantly challenging the government in these areas.  Some incentives
that currently exist may not last long.  Although the Internet speech
forum providers have thus far shown some level of willingness to take
up the fight for free speech, it is unlikely that those who ratified the
First Amendment envisioned that vindication of robust free speech
rights against government action would depend on the benevolence
of private business entities.
B. Free Speech and the Rise of Intermediary Doctrines
As described in the preceding sections, the Terms of Service con-
tract creates a shield against constitutional scrutiny of some speech-
related claims.  The effect of this shield is a regime that is roughly
analogous to the third party doctrine in the privacy sphere.  By choos-
ing to “speak” in a privately governed space, no matter how much that
space approximates a public forum, the user relinquishes a whole host
of legal rights that, had the user spoken in a public town square,
would not have been abrogated.  In the privacy context, when a per-
son chooses to entrust her information to a third party, the general
rule is that she no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
such information.145  In both of these circumstances, the individual’s
144 Harris II, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
145 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of informa-
tion revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third parties will not be betrayed.”). But see
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defen-
dant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal emails stored with a
third party Internet Service Provider and distinguishing from Miller in that personal
emails are not simple business records).
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rights are altered by entrusting her information or speech to a third
party.
In the non-Internet context, using a publishing intermediary
such as a newspaper or broadcast news does not result in the abroga-
tion of a constitutional analysis of attempts to interfere with that
speech.146  In the online context, however, because of the Terms of
Service,147 the contract analysis will govern.148  This contract analysis
would not govern speech in the context of a town square, in a pub-
lished op-ed, or in a broadcast editorial because there is no contract at
issue.149  Once a speaker decides to use the Internet as the medium
for her speech, by clicking on the Terms of Service she is essentially
agreeing that in the vast majority of circumstances the contract, not
the Constitution, will control with respect to interference with that
speech.150
In the privacy context, it is an open question to what extent put-
ting your personal information in the hands of a third party, like
Gmail, does or does not allow for a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.151  The use of the Internet medium may limit some privacy rights
because by using this technology, which necessitates the use of a third
146 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978) (holding that, of
all the popular forms of communication available at the time, broadcasting has the
most limited First Amendment protection because of the inherent scarcity of the
medium); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 580–81 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
university could not censor the contents of an English literary magazine); Dean v.
Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 813–14 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that a
student newspaper was a limited public forum and that suppression of an article in
that newspaper constituted a violation of the First Amendment).
147 Of course, those terms must fit the current jurisprudence of what constitutes a
reasonable Internet contract term.  Given the robust reading of freedom to contract
currently applied towards clickwrap or browsewrap contracts it is highly likely most
terms will be enforceable. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 480–90.
148 See Radin, supra note 16, and Seltzer, supra note 16, for a discussion of the
superseding power of Terms of Service, particularly in the context of copyrighted
speech.
149 C.f. Lemley, supra note 55, at 466 (noting that in the offline context most con-
sumer transactions, such as those in a grocery store, do not involve contracts, whereas
almost all Internet consumer transactions do).
150 Arguably, that a contract could have this effect on the user without the user
realizing the speech implications is at least as troubling as an arbitration clause that is
essentially hidden within the contract. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 2d 593, 606–11 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that the arbitration clause in the Sec-
ond Life Terms of Service was procedurally and substantively unconscionable both
because the Terms of Service agreement was a contract of adhesion and because the
arbitration clause forced the weaker party to arbitrate but gave the stronger party the
choice of forum, and thus had a lack of mutuality).
151 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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party,152 users put their information into the hands of others, which
places the secrecy or dissemination of that information at the mercy
of that third party.
In effect, the Terms of Service regime seemingly imports this
notion into the First Amendment context.  In choosing to use an
Internet platform owned by someone else for the dissemination of her
speech, the user involves a third party, which almost invariably means
the user agrees to some kind of contract.  This contract creates the
First Amendment equivalent of the privacy third party doctrine.  It
does so through the Internet speech forum provider’s reservation of
the right to store and remove content for certain reasons, including
the removal of content pursuant to government take-down requests.
By speaking in a contract-governed space, free speech is subject
to a buyer-beware regime where users must pick which third party to
entrust their speech to, which third party will be most likely to protect
their speech against government intrusion, and which third party will
be least likely to interfere with the speech themselves.153  This begins
to resemble the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.154  Do users have a reasonable expecta-
tion of protection from non-interference with their speech when they
entrust it to an Internet speech forum and agree to a Terms of Service
contract?  While this Note is not suggesting that this is the way a court
should analyze a First Amendment case concerning the Internet, since
expectations are not a factor in First Amendment inquiries, it is a
question that is being raised in the public discussion on Internet
speech.155
The effects of using an intermediary become more apparent if
one imagines a scenario in which an Internet speaker acts without an
Internet speech forum provider of any kind.  If a user owned a
152 Unless of course the user is the owner of a fiber-optic network and Internet
service provider, which is highly unlikely to say the least.
153 See Berman, supra note 32, at 1281 (“Such private law [like Terms of Service]
will create, in effect, a free market in law.  People will vote with their browsers by
flocking to those sites or providers whose law they find acceptable.”).
154 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(articulating the reasonable expectation test later courts widely adopt: “first . . . a
person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’”).
155 Matt Buchanan, Freedom of Speech Doesn’t Exist on Twitter (or Any Social Network),
BUZZFEED (July 30, 2012, 5:49PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mattbuchanan/free
dom-of-speech-doesnt-exist-on-twitter-or-any (arguing that speech is not free on the
Internet because social networks can take down or limit speech as they see fit and at
the request of private parties who might dislike what was said).
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domain name, designed, developed, and programmed her own web-
site, and if the government had an issue with content on that site, the
government would have to make their take-down request, or issue a
court order, to the speaker herself.  The speaker, if she wanted to chal-
lenge the government’s take-down request or court order, could bring
an action against the government.  In this scenario, the speaker has
the full arsenal of First Amendment jurisprudence and legal remedies
available to challenge the government’s action.156
If that same speaker puts the same content on Twitter, however,
by using the third party the speaker can only challenge the provider’s
take-down of the speech in the context of the Terms of Service and
under general contract law principles.157  And only the provider would
be in a position to push back against the government.158  In effect, by
putting the speech in the hands of the Internet speech forum, the
user may be unknowingly abrogating speech rights, given that subse-
quent interference with her speech is unlikely to be analyzed as a First
Amendment issue.159
For most ordinary citizens, owning and developing their own
website is not a realistic possibility due to lack of technical education,
time, or access to resources.  But the effect of the user agreement, the
state action doctrine, and private ordering functionally may require
speakers to be web developers and independent operators in order to
have full speech protection on the Internet.  By using these platforms
156 See supra Section III.A.
157 See supra Section III.B.
158 In the privacy context one court has explicitly rejected the user’s common
notion that any party who sought disclosure of their content would have to make the
request of the user themselves.  This furthers the crystalizing norm that on the
Internet, the forum provider is not just the content intermediary but the legal inter-
mediary: “The widely believed (though mistaken) notion that any disclosure of a
user’s information would first be requested from the user and require approval by the
user is understandable, but wrong.”  People v. Harris (Harris I), 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
159 Interestingly, in the privacy context courts are still willing to analyze the user’s
reasonable expectation in light of what the Terms of Service agreement provides.  As
a result, the Terms of Service agreement is still only an element of one’s expectation
of privacy.  Analytically, it does not replace it.  However, functionally, the Terms of
Service agreement has begun to supplant reasonable expectations because so long as
the contract is drawn broadly and the contract is enforceable, the user cannot have a
reasonable expectation in privacy they did not contractually retain.  So while the
Terms of Service agreement is powerful in Fourth Amendment Internet jurispru-
dence, it has not replaced it. See Harris II, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012)
(“[In the previous case t]he court’s decision [that the user did not have standing to
quash the subpoena] was partially based on Twitter’s then terms of service
agreement.”).
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and involving an outside party, the user limits her access to First
Amendment analysis and protection.  This happens in a medium cur-
rently most apt to give life to the stated purpose of the First Amend-
ment: to preserve a “marketplace of ideas.”160
The comparison to the privacy context also illuminates the con-
cern about the burden of litigation being placed on the Internet
speech forum provider.  This burden has already emerged with
respect to privacy litigation surrounding Internet speech forum prov-
iders.  In Harris I, the court rejected the defendant’s attempt to block
the production of his Twitter posts, holding that a criminal defendant
does not have standing to quash a subpoena made to Twitter, a third
party, for production of his tweets.161  It is up to Twitter to challenge
such information production requests in court.  With hundreds of
millions of users, can Twitter effectively review all subpoenas issued
for users’ tweets and move to quash all those that it does not feel it
should comply with?162
Additionally, there is a key difference between the ability of the
government to act in the Internet privacy context on one hand and
the Internet speech context on the other.  The Stored Communica-
tions Act (“SCA”) provides a framework and a process to which any
government actor must adhere if it seeks access to electronic
records.163  The legislative process has ensured a level of legal formal-
160 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
161 Harris I, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 510–11.
162 At least one court has not felt that the sheer volume of an Internet speech
forum like Twitter merits legal distinction or a reconsidering of the standing analysis
in light of technological advancement.  In Harris II, the court stated that Twitter’s
burden of supplying the information or attempting vindicate user rights in court “is
placed on every third-party respondent to a subpoena.” Harris II, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
163 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006).  The SCA states:
(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing ser-
vice to disclose the contents of any . . . electronic communication . . . (A)
without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental
entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures . . . or (B) with prior
notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer or if the
governmental entity (i) uses an administrative subpoena . . . or (ii) obtains a
court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section . . . .
Id. § 2703(b)(1).  The court in Warshak held that “to the extent that the SCA purports
to permit the government to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitu-
tional.”  United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).  Though the
ultimate fate of § 2703 at issue in Warshak is undecided, the larger point is that both
the legislature and the courts have imposed significant process requirements on a
governmental entity seeking a person’s electronically stored information from a third
party.  No such procedural requirements have been enacted for a governmental entity
seeking removal of content from an Internet speech forum provider.
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ity to which government requests to obtain information from third
party providers must adhere that is absent in the government take-
down request context.164  As the regime now stands, the Terms of Ser-
vice agreement provides the government the opportunity to make a
very informal request to the Internet speech forum provider and see if
it will comply.  Currently there is no requirement in the general
Terms of Service regime that government entities must seek some sort
of judicial process to request the removal of content.165  There is cer-
tainly no statutory regime, outside of the copyright context, requiring
legal process before the government makes a take-down request to an
Internet speech forum provider.
Courts can bypass the First Amendment implications present in
such speech entirely in favor of analyzing it as an information storage
issue because on the Internet all speech is committed to a digital form
of “information.”  In Harris I, the court addressed the question of
“whether a criminal defendant has standing to quash a subpoena
issued to a third-party on-line social networking service seeking to
obtain the defendant’s user information and postings.”166  In that
case, the Twitter user posted tweets that could have potentially served
as evidence of the user’s alleged participation in the Occupy Wall
Street protests.167  The user was charged with disorderly conduct after
he allegedly marched on the roadway of the Brooklyn Bridge.168
In its analysis in Harris I, the court subsumed the relevant First
Amendment considerations into a privacy analysis.  The Harris I court
likened Twitter’s role to that of a bank holding a customer’s bank
records, as in the famous Fourth Amendment case United States v.
Miller.169  After the court in Harris I ruled that the user had no stand-
ing to quash the subpoena in light of the third party doctrine, Twitter
itself then sought to quash the subpoena in Harris II.170  In analyzing
the privacy issue, the Harris II court framed it slightly differently, while
still citing Miller as authority171: “[p]ublication to third parties is the
issue” since there can be “no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
164 See supra note 95.  As the Google transparency report shows, some government
requests do come in the form of a court order of some type, but many are simply take-
down requests pursuant to the Terms of Service.
165 See supra note 89.
166 Harris I, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
167 Id. at 506.
168 Id.
169 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
170 Harris II, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
171 Id. at 594–95.
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tweet sent around the world.”172  Taking this further, the Harris II
court gives an example of a man shouting a statement that could indi-
cate criminal activity into the street and a passerby being asked to tes-
tify as a witness at trial.173  In this analogy “the street is an online,
information superhighway, and the witnesses can be the third-party
providers like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, or the next hot
social media application.”174
In the context of shouting into a street, while it cannot reasona-
bly be contended that such speech is private, the hypothetical pass-
erby is also not being held out as the owner or storage facility of the
information they have heard.  Their role is merely that of a witness to
the speech, not a repository of information.  Twitter, in the eyes of the
Harris II court, is both.  Twitter, and by reasonable extension any
Internet speech forum or social networking site, plays the role of meg-
aphone, street, passerby, tape recorder, and archivist.  In the court’s
reasoning “information” begins to sound like a euphemism obscuring
the issue that this “information” is actually the digital manifestation of
the user’s speech.175  This is significant because a relevant considera-
tion in most First Amendment cases is whether a regulation or govern-
ment action will have a chilling effect on speech.  In the bank-records
case, Miller,176 it was not a legal or social concern for the court
whether denying a person standing to quash production of their bank
records would have a chilling effect on citizens’ availing themselves of
banks.  Denial of standing to quash a subpoena to produce one’s
tweets or Facebook posts, and having to rely on the forum provider to
act on the user’s behalf, may make users think twice about using an
Internet speech forum to disseminate their speech.  By failing to rec-
ognize some key differences between speech postings on a private but
quasi-public forum and bank records, the court did not take into
account the unique speech implications present and the potential
chilling effects its holding could produce.
172 Id. at 593.
173 Id. at 594.
174 Id.
175 As noted by the court, the information at issue is both “non-content informa-
tion such as IP addresses, physical locations, browser type, subscriber information, etc.
and content information such as tweets.” Id. at 593.
176 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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C. Potential Solutions: Statutory Regime, Expanded Contract
Analysis, or Both
In light of the increasing similarities between the role the third
party Internet speech forum provider plays in both privacy and con-
tent take-down requests, one possible solution to regain the balance of
speech rights in the Internet context is some statutory regime that
operates similar to the Stored Communications Act.177  Under the
SCA, a governmental entity seeking action on the part of the Internet
speech forum provider is required by law to take certain formal
steps.178  The governmental actor can obtain either an undisclosed
warrant or a disclosed court order or subpoena.179  In the hypotheti-
cal speech process statute, the government could be required to sub-
mit actual notice to the user when the government requests a take-
down of content from the third party Internet speech forum pro-
vider.180  Or, similar to the SCA, the government could be required to
first seek a court order for the take-down, with a requirement that it
would have to show certain statutorily prescribed elements demon-
strating the legal authority to remove the speech at issue.  Given the
attention that Congress has given to restraining government action in
the Fourth Amendment context, more formal requirements for the
government with regard to First Amendment rights on the Internet
could similarly be prescribed.
The other option is for courts to consider a wider expanse of pub-
lic policy considerations when ruling on the substantive elements of
online Terms of Service.  Given the high level of deference courts give
to the enforceability of Terms of Service, and in the absence of con-
gressional restraints on government take-down requests, contract law
as it stands provides very little relief for a user who seeks to bring the
contract terms in line with his or her constitutional rights.
177 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2006).
178 See supra note 163.
179 Id.
180 There are of course complications that would arise in this.  The government
may not know the actual name or contact information of the user but rather just a
username.  Thus the Internet speech forum provider would have to be willing or
would have to be required to “unmask” the user so that the government could pro-
vide the user with notice of their take-down request.  This might implicate and
infringe upon the so-called “right to be anonymous.”  We will want to consider as a
polity whether the right to be anonymous trumps the desire to enforce speech rights
against the government.  These considerations would ultimately need to be balanced
in the effort to give users the ability to push back against government take-down
requests.
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CONCLUSION
As a descriptive matter, the users mentioned in Part I of this Note
were incorrect in believing that the White House’s request to have the
“Muslim Innocence” video reviewed under the YouTube Terms of Ser-
vice was an infringement upon Free Speech.  As a normative matter,
however, those user intuitions closely track the present need to pro-
tect both individual speech acts on the Internet and a robust speech
culture generally.  In today’s online context, the proverbial “town
square” now exists on Twitter, on Facebook, on YouTube, and on
future speech platforms not yet invented.  As a result so much of our
speech occurs in a “private law” space—that is, a sphere where the
Internet speech forum provider has the power to dictate what speech
it deems appropriate and what speech it reserves the right to remove,
even when this decision does not align with the First Amendment.
This has created a system where the government, by making take-
down requests, can effectively reach speech that it would be unconsti-
tutional for it to reach directly.  The fact that the user has the ability
to challenge the take-down through the contract terms is cold com-
fort.  Nevertheless, it is beneficial for the legal system and our speech
culture that users continue to raise the issue of “speech rights” on the
Internet whether or not the Constitution technically controls in the
instant case, as in the White House-YouTube incident described in
Part I.  As Professor Berman has urged, “we should focus on the Con-
stitution’s constitutive role in our cultural life, regardless of whether
that life is lived in the public or private sphere.”181  We should not
allow our norms in favor of the freedom to contract to impede our
ability to vindicate basic constitutional rights against government over-
reach, regardless of how that interference is effectuated.
181 Berman, supra note 32, at 1289.
